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Abstract
In Tanzania, health statistics have shown slow improvement, although spending on health
services in Tanzania is quite high. Defining the determinants of both health status and
health use is interesting to point out possibilities for policy. Using household data of the
rural Tanzanian mainland, one indicator of health status, the incidence of illness, is
examined here and three health demand variables, the incidence of treatment, the level
and the provider of treatment. For health outcome as well as health demand, the
importance of household income in Tanzania is striking. A positive cross-effect of
education on health could not be identified, except for rich Tanzanians. Distance to the
nearest health facility does not matter for the poorest patients. Although the measurement
of quality is problematic, the quality of the lower level medical care is found to have a
positive impact on health status and on health demand, more specifically the nonwage
component of quality. These results indicate that the introduction of cost recovery
schemes in the Tanzanian health system may have perverse effects, if not combined with a
price differentiation according to income and an improvement of quality of health
facilities.
I would like to thank the Tanzanian officials who helped gathering the government
expenditures data used in this paper, and also Stefan Dercon, Erik Schokkaert, Micheline
Goedhuys en Dirk Van de Gaer for their comments. Responsibility for all errors is mine
alone. The readers are welcome to send their remarks to the author: Ilse Frederickx, CES,
Naamsestraat 69, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium; email ilse.frederickx@econ.kuleuven.ac.be;
telephone +32.(0)16.32.68.51; fax +32.(0)16.32.67.96.
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31. Introduction: Health outcomes and health sector in Tanzania
Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world, with an economy heavily dependent
on agriculture. The World Bank finds that in 1991, 51 % of the population had incomes of
less than an absolute poverty line of $1 per day per person.  The country has gone through
some important economic and political changes during the last decade. Since 1984,
structural adjustment programmes started running under pressure of the IMF and the major
donors. One possible consequence of the fiscal restraint introduced by the structural
adjustment programmes may have been a deterioration of public services, like the
education and health sector (Tanzania The Challenge of Reforms: Growth, Incomes and
Welfare, 1996).
Demographic and health indicators1 in Tanzania have been poor and have shown only slow
improvement over the years, while the demand for health care is on the rise. Mortality and
morbidity levels in Tanzania are quite high. Life expectancy at birth, for instance, is only 50
years. In the Demographic Health Survey of 1991-1992, indicators of malnutrition
suggested that 19.8 % of the children under five years old were severely stunted, 46.7 %
moderately stunted. Infant and child mortality rates are high2, but within the range
expected, given the country’s low income level, and consistent with those in the Sub-
Saharan African region. Nevertheless, reductions in outcomes have been slow in coming,
compared with the income growth that started in the mid-1980s. Population growth and
diseases like AIDS are some of the reasons why demand for health care is increasing in
Tanzania. AIDS places large burdens on the curative health system and threatens to
reverse the progress made in health statistics.
There appears to be a problem on the supply side of the health sector. Tanzania has a
mainly publicly-funded health system, directed towards primary health care in rural areas.
The Tanzanian government has built a vast network of health services, with donor
assistance, following the administrative levels of the central-local government structure;
dispensaries close to villages, rural health centres, and hospitals (district, regional and
                                                 
1 For more details, look at Table 4 in Appendix II.
2 According to the Demographic Health Survey, 92 of every 1000 children die before the age of one. The
Sub-Saharan average is 99 to 1000.
4consultant hospitals) in towns and large cities3. The extensive network of health facilities
has led to better access, since distances to health care centers have been shortened. The
health system is heavily subsidised4, but health resources are concentrated at the hospital
level and for curative services, even though lower level care and prevention is officially
seen as a priority. Unfortunately, it is not clear that higher spending has been translated
into better performance of the health care system. The basic rural health services function
poorly due to lack of drugs, inadequate salaries for personnel and poor maintenance of
government health facilities. Patients will typically bypass lower-level health facilities in
favour of hospitals, to receive high quality care (Tanzania Social Sector Review, 1995).
Since the beginning of the 1990s, expanding demand for services and declining service
quality has led to the re-legalisation of the private sector and the introduction of user fees
or cost-sharing in the public facilities.
In conclusion, the spending on health services in Tanzania is quite high, yet the impact on
the actual health situation has been small. Although a large infrastructure is available, the
quality of health services is declining at all levels and investments in the distribution system
of drugs and in personnel are necessary. The implementation of user fees and cost sharing
and the privatisation of health care can alleviate the burden of the government, but careful
targeting of the poor will be necessary. In this paper, I  will look at the effect on health
outcome and health use of factors such as household income, distance to the closest health
infrastructure and quality of that infrastructure.
Defining the determinants of both health status and health use is interesting to point out
possibilities for policy. Public spending on health is obviously a candidate. The question
here is whether government expenditures are associated with health outcomes and demand,
after controlling for the socio-economic factors that normally influence the latter, such as
                                                 
3 At the national level there are four major referral hospitals in major towns and urban areas, one of which
is the university teaching hospital. Most regions have a regional hospital and there are a total of 170
hospitals in 106 districts. At the divisional level there are about 276 rural health centres and at the ward
level there are about 3014 dispensaries. At the village level, there are village health posts staffed by two
village health workers. It is estimated that there are currently around 5550 village health workers in the
country. This is about 1 village health worker per 5000 inhabitants.
4 The approximate health expenditures share of GDP was 2.4 % in 1993/94, making up 8 % of total
government spending from 1989/90 to 1992/93 (these are favourable shares compared to other developing
countries: according to the latest UNDP figures, Tanzanian public expenditures on health are 3.2 % of
GDP, while only 2.5 % for all Sub-Saharan Africa and 1.8 for the Least Developed Countries).
Development expenditures accounted for 29 % of total sector spending (in 1993/94), mostly coming from
large donors.
5household wealth, education, family size... The latest development in this field of research
is to account not only for quantity, but also for the quality of health (Alderman and Lavy,
1996). The methodology followed here to investigate the effects on health will be
regression analysis. We will estimate the reduced-form demand relation for health inputs
and outcomes, using (shadow)prices, income, individual and household characteristics as
explanatory variables.
2. Theoretical model
As a theoretical framework to study health, the household model is used. For the standard
formulation of the health demand model, we refer to Behrman and Deolalikar (1988) and
Strauss and Duncan (1995). To include household decisions regarding human capital, like
education and health, the model requires some modification. Let U be household utility
defined by:
U = U ( C, H, E; x ), the household utility function
(1)
C = Ca + Cm + Cl
Ca = household consumption of home produced commodities
Cm
 = household consumption of market purchased commodities
Cl = household leisure time
H = vector of health of household members
E  = vector of education of household members
x = household characteristics, taste norms
This household utility function is subject to the agricultural production function, the time
and budget constraints5, but also to constraints directly related to health, like the health
production function of the individual:
Hi = H ( Ni, C, I , Ei, Ek, TiH, TkH, Ri, hi ,W ), the health production function
(2)
Hi = health of individual I with  i = 1, …, I
I = number of individuals in household, household size
Ni = nutrient intake of individual i
Ei = education of individual i
Ek = education of key person(s) in household for health
TiH = time devoted to health by individual i
TkH = time devoted to health by key person(s) in household for health
Ri = use of health related services in community by individual i
hi = health make-up of individual i
                                                 
5 For the details of the standard formulation of these constraints, we refer again to Behrman and Deolalikar
(1988) and Strauss and Duncan (1995).
6W = community characteristics
The use of health infrastructure, Ri, is an endogenous variable dependent on income,
education, tastes etc. On the other hand, community availability of health (related)
infrastructure is an exogenous covariate, that can be rationed, both in terms of quantity and
quality. To determine health status, health care demand and health care choice, the fully
reduced form is estimated. Deduced form demand equations are obtained by maximizing
equation (1) subject to (2) and the common production, time and income constraints.
Corresponding to this theoretical framework, Hi, as health status, and Ri, as health care
demand and choice of health care type, will be analysed in this paper as functions of
household characteristics and the features of health care supply in Tanzania. Special
attention will be given to the role of the household income, the availability and the quality
of health services as determinants of outcome of health and demand for health care.
3. Empirical model
The left-hand side variables to be used in the empirical analysis will be binary. For example,
we will analyse the factors determining whether someone is ill or whether treatment is
sought. The variable observed and to be explained, called y, is a dummy variable, and the
probability that it assumes the value 1 will be estimated by the logistic regression
representation of the logit model6, wh re is the base of the natural logarithms and where
P is the linear combination of the independent variables (Liao, 1994):
[ ]Prob Prob( ) ( )y y= - =1 1 1 = e kk
K
kxb
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The parametersbk  of the model are estimated using the maximum-likelihood method.
To find the marginal effect of a change in one explanatory variable on the probability of the
event happening (while all other independent variables are held constant at their sample
averages), the change-in-probability method is used, calculating the difference of the
predicted probabilities with and without the change, instead of the usual partial derivative
of that probability with respect to the i-th independent variable (Liao, 1994). Marginal
                                                 
6 Jianghui, Suhua and Lucas (1997) also use the logistic regression model to analyse morbidity and
outpatient service utilisation in poor rural China.
7effects for a one unit or a 10 % change in the independent variables are calculated. When
the changing explanatory variable is a dummy, the probability conditional on each of the
two categories in the dummy is compared.
The way that health is modelled can lead to some bias problems. Take a look at the stages
of sampling in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Curative Health Care Modelling
Dispensary or
Health Centre
Hospital
Public
Private
Treatment No Treatment
Illness or Injury No Illness or Injury
Sample
The mere fact of using self-reported survey data induces the mortality selection bias and
the self-reporting bias. Very unhealthy people are not included in samples, while those
included in the sample typically will report more health problems when they are rich and
well-educated. The positive relationship between a higher education or a higher socio-
economic status and a higher probability of reporting incidence of illness has been
established in many studies (Behrman and Deolalikar 1988, Strauss and Thomas, 1995).
The tree structure of the model causes a sample selection bias. It can be argued that the
subsamples in the different stages are not random anymore. Unobservables (e.g. severity of
illness) that influence the first stage (falling ill) can also be correlated with those influencing
the second and third stage (searching treatment and choosing the kind of treatment). In the
literature, no consensus has been reached on the question whether this is a substantial
problem and how to solve it7. Authors who accounted for the correlation between
disturbance terms, found correction terms insignificant (Lavy and Guigley (1993) for
Ghana, Appleton (1995) for Kenya, Dow (1996) for Côte d’Ivoire).
                                                 
7 In appendix VI, we tried one way of dealing with the bias problems: restructuring the sample.
8Here, a sequential approach to modelling health is followed, because the self-reporting bias
will distort the identification of correction terms and the set of explanatory variables  is not
exactly the same in each stage. As dependent variables, dichotomous variables are used for
a practical and theoretical reason. Constructing more than two alternatives would lead to
some empty categories. Furthermore, the assumption of independence of irrelevant
alternatives necessary for a multinomial logit could be hard to maintain when discussing
level and provider of treatment.
In the next section, the Tanzanian sample and the construction of dependent and
independent variables will be discussed.
4. Data set and variables
For this study, data of the Tanzania Human Resource Development Survey8 w re
supplemented by government data on recurrent government expenditures on health centres
and dispensaries on the district level9. Taking only the rural districts gives us a data set of
2479 rural households (with 15128 individuals).
The health outcome as defined in the model above is not directly observed. One possibility
is to use self-reported indicators, such as reports of ill-health and its duration, with all the
problems of recall errors and of a possible self-reporting bias10 this ent ils. Unfortunately,
the nature of the information on health in the survey leaves us no other choice than to use
these self-reported measures.
The demand for health care as a dependent variable, the inputs into the health production
process (not measures of health outcome itself), can be measured as the incidence of
treatment and the type of treatment (the choice between modern or traditional, public or
private, preventive or curative health care, dispensary or hospital, etc.). Health care inputs,
such as the presence of water supply and the availability of medical care facilities (distance
                                                 
8 The survey was carried out during late 1993 and early 1994 by the Faculty of Economics at the University
of Dar es Salaam, the Planning Commission of the Government of Tanzania, and the World Bank and
covered 5184 households (with 29914 individuals).
9 A complete table of government expenditures is given in appendix III.
10 Cfr. supra p. 9.
9and quality) can also enter into the equation as independent variables at the household and
community level.
Turning to the variables constructed  for the regressions in this paper, descriptive statistics
are given in Table 1. As dependent variable for health outcome, a proxy for health Hi in the
theoretical model, a dummy “incidence of illness or injury” was constructed. In the survey,
the question on this was asked for the last four weeks. As for the health care demand
proxies, to measure the input Ri in the health production function of the theoretical model,
a dummy for “incidence of treatment” and two dummies for “type of treatment” were
used11. A distinction was made between the level of treatment: dispensaries and health
centres being the lowest level of health care in Tanzania and hospitals the highest level.
Another distinction for type of treatment was made as to the provider of treatment, being
either a government health facility or the less spread private providers.
Variables of the individual, household and community level were entered as explanatory
factors. At the individual level, age and sex were included. The sex dummy is entered to
investigate the gender differentials in human capital investments and outcomes found in
many developing countries (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). At  the household level, a number
of variables indicating the household structure were used: the proportion of female adults,
of boys and girls (younger than 15 years) in the household. Next to these, a few
characteristics of the household head are given: the age and gender of the head and a
dummy for his or her completion of primary education12. Sex of the head is also entered, to
test whether female-headed households are better-off in health matters. Finally, a proxy for
wealth of the household had to be constructed. In this case, the consumption expenditures
in Tanzanian shillings per month per person in the household are used13.
As for community level variables, some measures of service availability and quality are
included. Here, the distance to the nearest health facility, expressed in kilometres, has been
used. This measure should be considered as the opportunity cost for an ill or injured
individual to visit a health care facility. Of course, estimated impacts of service availability
                                                 
11 Data on treatment are only available for those with illness or injury. Not all those with illness or injury
have answered the questions about seeking treatment and what kind of treatment.
12 Since half of the persons in the sample had no education at all, the threshold is set at the final year of
primary education.
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can be biased if service quality is not also measured. People can travel beyond the closest
health care facility, due to important quality differences in facilities, especially in Tanzania
(Tanzania Social Sector Review, 1995).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables
Variable name Mean Standard Frequencies of
DEPENDENT VARIABLES deviation dummies
Health status 0 1 total
illness/injury last 4 weeks (yes=1) 0.1 0.4 12956 2221 15177
Health use
treatment (yes=1) 0.7 0.5 752 1466 2218
disp/hc or hospital treatment (hospital=1)0.3 0.5 929 375 1304
public or private treatment (private=1)0.4 0.5 901 549 1450
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Individual
age 20.5 17.9
ln(age) 2.6 1.0
age squared 743.5 1185.2
ln (age squared) 7.9 5.0
sex (female=1) 0.5 0.5 7441 7775 15216
Household
proportion of women in household 0.5 0.2
proportion of boys in household 0.3 0.2
proportion of girls in household 0.3 0.2
age household head 45.6 13.7
ln (age household head) 3.8 0.3
sex household head (female=1) 0.1 0.3 13622 1461 15083
primary education head (completed=1)0.4 0.5 9014 5889 14903
 consumption/month/capita 910.8 1602.5
 ln (consumption/month/capita) 6.1 1.1
Community
distance dispensary/health centre 6.1 28.1
distance hospital 31.7 32.7
distance private health facility 19.7 32.6
distance public health facility 5.9 10.3
total government disp/hc expenditures3840355 1334470
ln (total government disp/hc expenditures)15.1 0.3
wage government expenditures2298838.6840225.0
ln (wage government expenditures)14.6 0.3
non-wage government expenditures1541516.5631777.0
ln (non-wage government expenditures)14.2 0.3
% of non-wage in total 0.4 0.1
Note: Total number of individuals in rural areas in survey is 15218.
Measuring quality is quite problematic, since supply side as well as demand side
considerations are mixed and since the relation between quality, on the one hand, and
illness or health care demand, on the other hand, should be negative (Alderman and Lavy,
1996). To proxy quality, sometimes very crude density measures, such as the number of
                                                                                                                                       
13 As the survey data on consumption were not correctly collected, it was not possible to account for
consumption of agricultural home production, so only purchased consumption is used here.
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local doctors per capita in the community, are used (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). A number
of authors use expenditure data. Deolalikar (1995) uses recurrent government health
expenditures per capita of a province in Indonesia and considers it to proxy availability as
well as quality of health facilities. Akin, Guilkey and Denton use expenditure on care per
person in the population as a quality measure for Nigeria (Alderman and Lavy, 1996). In
our regressions, the quality14 of health care in dispensaries and health centres is measured
by the recurrent15 government expenditures in Tanzanian shillings per dispensary or health
centre of the district16. For these budgets, the share of expenditures17 spent on wages of
personnel and non-wage items (medicines, food, utensils, driving vehicles etc.) are known,
the first being a proxy for quality in terms of staff and the second for quality in terms of
availability of equipment and drugs18.
Unfortunately, these budgets are just averages per primary health facility in a district,
which involves the risk of inaccuracy. Under ideal circumstances, the data of the household
survey should complemented by a full survey on the characteristics of the health facility.
Since we lack such provider survey data, an approximation of quality will have to be used.
As already mentioned, high government expenditures have not lead to better quality on the
national level. This does not have to be contradictory to the use of expenditures as a
quality measure, since the budgets used here are only those for rural areas and only for
primary health care. In the national budget, the distribution of expenditures is skewed to
the urban areas and to hospital care (Tanzania Social Sector Review, 1995).
To differentiate the effect of some independent variables in the behavioural response of the
poor and the rich, some interaction terms were added: schooling of the household head,
consumption and the distance to a health facility were interacted with a dummy for being
                                                 
14 The HRDS data also include questions on the subjectively perceived quality of each public facility
(school or health clinic). Nayaran and Pritchett (1996) state that a quality index could be constructed with
these data, but raise some questions about reliability or interpretation of the rankings.
15 Only recurrent costs were known, no account was made for capital costs, which may lead to a bias. The
numerous budgetary sources for the sector, of different administrative levels, as well as foreign funds,
make the reconstruction of the developmental or recurrent and actual or budgeted expenditure a very
complex task.
16 Government expenditures are expressed per dispensary or health centre in the district and not per capita,
to exclude the effect of population density, since the distance to a health facility is already indicative of
population density.
17 In appendix III, Table 5 gives the expenditures per rural district.
18 When entering these two budget variables, the wage and the non-wage budget, multicollinearity became
a problem of a serious degree. Replacing them by the total budget and the percentage of the non-wage in
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poor19. Since half of the Tanzanian population can be considered to be poor according to
World Bank standards, the sample was divided into poor and rich, the dummy being equal
to one for those belonging to the group that consumes less than the total sample
population median consumption20.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Frequencies
In the sample of rural individuals, almost 15 % of the people had suffered from illness or
injury during the last 4 weeks prior to the survey21 (Table 2). Of those 15 % ill or injured,
66 %  sought care. This number is in line with findings in neighbouring countries of
Tanzania22. Women and older people are more likely to report illness, but they are less
likely to seek treatment. Households with an illiterate head report less illness and seek less
care. Across the welfare groups, the differences become even more explicit. The poorest
quartile of households were almost half as likely as the richest quartile to report illness (12
versus 21 %). The poorest are also less likely to seek care than the richest (61 % versus 74
%)23.
Clearly, the problem of the self-reporting bias arises for the data on incidence of illness.
Appleton explains that measures of self-reported morbidity may not indicate the differences
                                                                                                                                       
the total budget reduced correlation from 0.6 to 0.1 and kept the information given by these variables
intact.
19 The likelihood ratio test showed that the model with 3 interaction terms is significantly different from a
model without any interaction terms at all. This justifies the inclusion of the interaction terms. The
likelihood ratio test also showed that the model with 3 interaction terms is not significantly different from
a model where an interaction term is included for every variable. This justifies why only these 3 interaction
terms are included.
20 For instance, this means that the coefficient of the consumption variable gives the effect on illness or
treatment, for both the rich and the poor, while the interaction term coefficient explicates the extra effect
for the poor only. To find the total effect for the poor, both coefficients should be added. Or, in
mathematical terms, b ek
k
K
kx
=
å +
1
 = …+ bi Xi + bi
* Xi
P +…  =…+ bi Xi
R + ( bi + bi* ) Xi
P + …
if Xi  = X Xi
R
i
P+ in which X are data matrices, R refers to the rich and P to the poor.
21 For comparison, Deolalikar (1995) looks at the reporting of illness in Indonesia, but then during the last
week, finding 11 % ill. Dercon (1996) investigates Ethiopian panel data and finds an average of 16 % ill
the last 4 weeks. Lavy and Germain find 36 % ill the last thirty days in their Ghanaian sample.
22 For rural Ethiopia it is about 55 %, for Kenya close to 70 %, for Uganda close to 90 % (Dercon, 1996),
for Ghana 44 % (Lavy and Quigley, 1993).
23 The same phenomenon was found in rural Ethiopia, but the difference between the poor and the rich
quartile not so big: 52 % of the poor sought treatment versus 59 % of the rich (Dercon, 1996).
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in illness itself, but rather reflect the differences in sensitivity to illness, whether real or
illusory (Appleton, 1995). This would mean for Tanzania that the rich are not necessarily
more in ill-health, but they report more illness, since they are better informed about the
causes and symptoms of diseases. Little can be done to eliminate the self-reporting bias
completely, except control for the variables it is related to, like education, experience and
welfare.
To explain why a particular level or provider of care was chosen two distinctions were
made. A first distinction is the level: whether the sick go to primary (dispensaries and
health centres) or secondary health care (district, regional or major referral hospitals).
Although the health system is designed to function on the basis of referrals from the lowest
service up, the sick tend to go directly to the highest accessible tier, where quality of both
staff and equipment can be expected to be better, if one can afford the higher prices24 o be
paid in hospitals. Analysis of the pattern of the use of services by provider is important in
designing the government’s own investments as well in designing policies that govern the
activities of the private sector (Bedri Kello and Abraha, 1997). The private sector is known
to have better drugs supplies system and to possess better equipment and infrastructure.
But the public sector is more subsidised and has more qualified personnel.
In our sample, 71 % of the treated ill choose basic health care (Table 2). This means that
almost 30 % of the rural inhabitants go directly to a hospital for the first treatment of their
ailment. When looking at the choice of providers of health care, either public
(governmental) or private (missions, for-profit practitioners or employer-owned
establishments), 62 % of those sick and seeking treatment go to a government provider25.
This means almost 40 % of the rural population goes to private health care, although the
private sector is not well developed at all in Tanzania and thus at a greater distance26.
Public basic health care is still the most important branch of the health system.
Across welfare groups, no sharp differences are found for the choice of the level of health
care, except for the higher middle quartile of which 36 % go to a hospital. But for the type
                                                 
24 Prices are higher due user fees, travelling costs and expenditures on medicines.
25 For comparison, in rural Ethiopia, 55 % of all ill go to government providers (Dercon, 1996), in urba
Ethiopia more than 60 % (Bedri Kello and Abraha, 1997), in Ghana 41 % (Lavy and Germain, 1994).
26 Cf. the descriptive statistics: the mean distance to the nearest private health facility is 19,7 km, for the
nearest public facility 5,9 km.
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of provider of health care, across the welfare distribution, a strong divergence is found: 30
% of the poorest quartile seeks treatment in private facilities, against 51 % of the richest. It
seems that for the level of health care, people have no choice. Since they live in rural areas,
all hospitals are far away. But as regards the use of government-owned or private facilities,
the richer income groups do avoid the public sector.
Men frequent hospitals more often, while women seem to visit the private health system
slightly more often. Across age groups, the picture is not that clear. Of the older people 33
% goes to hospital, while only 25 % of the children does. Especially people in the
productive stage of their life seem to seek care in private health facilities. Education makes
a bigger difference for the choice between public and private health care than for the
choice between low or high level services: 39.5 % of the people in a family with an
educated head visit private health care, 36 % of those without an educated head. This may
occur because of shorter waiting times at private health care and the better educated have a
higher value of time.
15
Table 2: Observed frequencies for reporting illness or injury during the last 4 weeks by the rural, for seeking treatment by the rural ill or injured, for level of treatment: primary
(dispensary/health centre) or secondary (hospital) health care level and for provider of treatment: public (government) or private (mission etc.) health facility
peopleillness or injury people treatment people illevel of treatmentpeople illprovider of treatment
yes no ill/injured yes no & treatedhospital disp/hc & treatedprivate public
n° n° % n° % n° n° % n° % n° n° % n° % n° n° % n° %
Total sample 151772221 14.61295685.4 2218146666.1752 33.9 130437528.892971.2 1450549 37.9 90162.1
By gender Male 7416 987 13.3 6429 86.7 985 660 67.0325 33.0 579 17830.740169.3 652 240 36.8 41263.2
Female 77591234 15.9 6525 84.1 1233 806 65.4427 34.6 725 19727.252872.8 798 309 38.7 48961.3
By age group Child 75071014 13.5 6493 86.5 1013 675 66.6338 33.4 610 15525.445574.6 670 243 36.3 42763.7
Adult 5209 729 14.0 4480 86.0 728 480 65.9248 34.1 430 13431.229668.8 475 190 40.0 28560.0
Elderly 2111 477 22.6 1634 77.4 476 310 65.1166 34.9 264 86 32.617867.4 304 115 37.8 189 62
By welfare group Poorest quartile 5919 698 11.8 5221 88.2 698 428 61.3270 38.7 376 99 26.327773.7 422 126 29.9 29670.1
Lower middle quartile4539 629 13.9 3910 86.1 628 415 66.1213 33.9 374 96 25.727874.3 412 135 32.8 27767.2
Higher middle
quartile
3114 548 17.6 2566 82.4 547 368 67.3179 32.7 334 12136.221363.8 365 162 44.4 20355.6
Richest quartile 1602 344 21.5 1258 78.5 343 253 73.8 90 26.2 218 59 27.115972.9 249 126 50.6 12349.4
By education of headE ucated head 5868 928 15.8 4940 84.2 927 630 68.0297 32.0 568 16328.740571.3 626 247 39.5 37960.5
Not educated head 90011244 13.8 7757 86.2 1242 804 64.7438 35.3 708 20529.050371.0 794 285 35.9 50964.1
Note: Only data of rural Tanzania mainland are included. For age groups: a child has age <= 15, an elderly has age > 40 years. For education of head: if household head has completed primary school
or higher, then (s)he is considered educated. For welfare groups: the consumption per capita in the household per month is under 333.92 Tanzanian shilling for 1st quartile, between 333.92 and
794.68 (median) for 2nd quartile between 794.68 and 1865.56 for 3rd quartile, between 1865.56 and 270463.3 (maximum) for 4th quartile.
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Table 3: Logistic regression results
Dependent variablesIncidence of illness Incidence of treatment Level of treatment Provider of treatment
(1=ill) (1=treated) (1=hospital) (1=private)
-2 Log Likelihood Restricted Model 11103.5280 2535.9522 1297.227 1437.656
-2 Log Likelihood Full Model 10579.8060 2485.8520 1106.673 1297.216
Chi-Square 523.7220 50.1010 190.554 140.441
Significance Level 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000
Chow test (no vs. some effects for poor) 12.330 (7.815) 7.271 (7.815) 30.939 (9.488) 20.149 (9.488)
Chow test (some vs. all effects for poor) 10.635 (18.307) 10.258 (18.307) 13.177 (18.307) 11.084 (18.307)
Independent variables Coefficient Wald-statisticSig Coefficient Wald-statisticSig Coefficient Wald-statisticSig Coefficient Wald-statisticSig
ln(age) -1.358 288.225** -0.583 13.330** -0.014 0.004 0.391 3.556 +
ln (age squared) 0.305 303.073** 0.120 12.110** 0.036 0.522 -0.083 3.200 +
sex (female=1) 0.295 30.533** -0.048 0.213 -0.169 1.140 0.321 4.853 *
proportion women household-0.554 4.067 * -0.904 3.500 + -0.336 0.208 0.219 0.105
proportion boys household-0.763 13.722** -0.556 2.067 0.372 0.417 0.144 0.076
proportion girls household-0.291 1.734 0.970 5.717 * 0.444 0.475 -0.748 1.623
ln (age household head)-0.004 0.002 -0.217 1.436 0.741 6.421 ** -0.131 0.240
sex head (female=1) 0.339 15.713** 0.348 4.299 * -0.119 0.224 -0.031 0.021
education head (completed=1)0.163 3.565 + -0.037 0.048 0.722 8.705 ** -0.155 0.504
education head (completed=1)*poor-0.208 3.750 * -0.035 0.028 -0.540 2.985 + 0.115 0.168
 ln (consumption/month/capita)0.229 54.889** 0.179 8.589 ** -0.177 3.302 + 0.187 4.701 *
 ln (consumption/month/capita)*poor0.002 0.019 -0.021 0.509 0.035 0.542 -0.017 0.157
distance dispensary/health centre-0.005 2.370 -0.024 5.326 * 0.071 9.921 **
distance dispensary/health centre*poor0.007 4.379 * 0.025 5.836 * -0.073 10.464 **
distance hospital -0.031 28.718 **
distance hospital*poor -0.018 4.133 *
distance private health facility -0.028 15.004**
distance private health facility*poor 0.011 1.644
distance public health facility 0.096 16.645**
distance public health facility*poor -0.086 12.070**
ln (total government disp/hc expenditures)-0.380 19.422** -0.088 0.296 -0.128 0.266 0.436 3.297 +
% of non-wage in total 0.296 0.734 0.740 1.173 -3.716 12.361 ** 4.537 22.195**
constant 3.842 7.320 ** 2.279 0.766 1.076 0.072 -9.832 6.337 **
Note: Sig = significance level of: ** = between 0 and 1 %, * = between 1 and 5 % and + = between 5 and 10 %. The first Chow test checks if a model without any interaction
terms for the poor is equal to the model actually used with poverty dummies included for some variables. If the likelihood ratio exceeds the critical Chi-square value between
brackets, the null hypothesis of equality is rejected. The second Chow test does the same for the model actually used and a model with interaction terms for all variables.
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5.2. Regression results
Let us now turn to the regression results. For the incidence of illness, the dummy used
assumes a value of 0 for the healthy and a value of 1 for the ill. For the incidence of
treatment, it is 0 for not treated and 1 for treated. For the type of treatment, the dummy is
1 when going to hospital instead of a dispensary or health centre and 1 when going to the
private instead of public sector. The results of running the logistic regressions are given in
Table 3.
First, the chi square statistics indicate that the full model (containing all independent
variables) is significantly different from the reduced model (with only an intercept term) for
all four regressions. Secondly, two Chow tests were performed to check the stability of the
regression coefficients, in this case to check whether the coefficients of the subsamples for
the poor and the rich were constant. Basically, this procedure was done to confine the
number of interaction terms consisting of variables and the dummy for the poor. For the
four cases, the model with a limited number of interaction terms is preferred over a model
including all possible interaction terms. Thirdly, to test whether the coefficient of each
variable separately is zero, a Wald statistic, following a chi square distribution is being
used27. To interpret the parameters shown to be significantly different from zero by the
Wald test, one has to keep in mind that the left-hand side consists of an odds ratio, the
probability of the event occurring (e.g. reporting ill) over the probability of the event not
occurring28. This means that if a significant coefficient bi is positive (negative), the factor
by which the odds change when Xi increases with one unit, ebi, is larger (smaller) than one,
so this is increasing (decreasing) the odds.
Some patterns emerge. Falling ill and seeking treatment is related to individual and
household characteristics. For the type of treatment (its level as well as its provider), the
most significant variables are community characteristics. We will discuss some of the
independent variables in more detail.
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A clear gender bias in terms of women falling more ill and having less access to care is not
found in Tanzania. Women report significantly more illness. When the individual is a
woman, her probability to report an illness is 3 % higher than for a man (his probability
being 0.114 and hers 0.147). Either women are really unhealthy in Tanzania (which would
not be surprising considering high maternal mortality rates) and/or they are better informed
on health risks (thanks to health campaigns). But women do not seek significantly more or
less treatment, compared to men. If women seek care, they go more to the private sector.
Being a female patient increases the probability of visiting a private sector health facility by
7 %. Probably, women go more to the private sector, because the latter provides more
maternal and child health services. For the level of care (primary health care or hospitals)
no significant discrimination was found.
A kind of ‘female autonomy effect’ can be observed. When the sex of the household head
is considered, the probability for reporting illness in a female-headed household is 4 %
higher than for the male-headed (a probability of 0.169 versus 0.127). The probability of
seeking treatment is 8 % higher (from 0.604 to 0.684). Women can let their higher
awareness about health and illness matters pay off in the form of more likely treatment of
diseases, if they are in a more powerful position.
A completed primary education of the household head only pays off for the rich in their
recognition of diseases and their decision to go to hospital. For individuals who are less
better-off, the education effect is not that large in health matters. For the poor the positive
effect of education on reporting illness is turned negative (0.163 - 0.208 = - 0.045). The
effect of education on choosing a hospital is partly eliminated (0.722 - 0.540 = 0.182) for
the poor. In choosing the level of health care, poor educated people do not really seem to
have an option due to the more expensive treatment at hospitals. For the type of provider,
public or private, a difference between literate and illiterate or between the rich and the
poor for education does not come out as significant. In general, returns to education in
areas having traditional agriculture are low (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). Probably, in
health matters, education starts playing only in the form of access to information, as
Mackinnon (1995) argues for child health outcomes Uganda. This means investing more in
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education may not have the positive cross-effect on health which is usually assumed29.
School enrolment rates are very low in rural Tanzania. Half of the sample had no education
at all. Of those who start going to school, only few complete basic education, and even less
continue to secondary education. Only rich people obtain benefit from education for their
health. Furthermore, Behrman and Deolalikar (1988) claim that education can increase the
use of health facilities (which is already high in Tanzania), but this is not always necessarily
translated into better health statistics.
Throughout all four regressions, monthly consumption per household member is a decisive
determinant of health. Being rich makes you report more illness, seek more care and seek
care by private providers. In other studies, response to wealth was not always found
(Behrman and Deolalikar 1988, Appleton 1995). The marginal effects of an increase in
consumption show that gaining more income has a positive and large effect for the rich,
but a small and negative one for the poor, except for the reports of illness. Concerning the
treatment for instance, if the Tanzanian richer half of the population gets a 10 % increase in
consumption, their chances for seeking cure when ill increase by 2 % (from 0.612 to
0.637). If the poor could consume 10 % more, the probability falls with -0.006 (from
0.612 to 0.606). Richer households tend to utilise private facilities more than poorer
families since private facilities are more expensive financially while being less costly in
terms of waiting time (Bedri Kello and Abraha 1997). A 10 % increase in consumption has
demonstrated again to have an effect of smaller size and with a different sign for the
Tanzanian poor compared to the rich. Poor people have other priorities than health to
spend their money on, when facing an income increase.
Distance to the nearest health facility has mainly an effect for the treatment of the rural
rich, demonstrating their opportunity cost of time spent on health matters, since the rich
usually also have a higher education and higher wages in jobs outside the agricultural
sector. The further away the closest dispensary or health centre, the smaller the chances of
seeking treatment. The further away from the closest dispensary or health centre, the more
likely Tanzanian patients will go to hospital. As the distance to closest private facility
increases and as the closest government health service is nearer, the less the chances are to
go to the private sector. In a similar way, Appleton (1995), Dercon (1996) and Lavy and
                                                 
29 Adding an interaction term consisting of education and sex of the household head did not produce a
significant effect. So, having an educated female household head does not pay off in health matters.
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Germain (1994) find distance to health facilities to affect the take-up of the ill and the
choice of health facility in Kenya, Ethiopia and Ghana. But in Tanzania, the distance
coefficients become almost zero for the poor. The poor do not consider distance a matter
of importance in a decision on treatment or choice of treatment. In other words, the poor
have a very low opportunity cost, meaning that the return to work is very low.
Although the measure of quality was only available for dispensaries and health centres,
some conclusions can be drawn. Living in a district with high quality basic health care has a
positive impact on health status (while living close to a facility has no impact at all for
incidence of illness). For the level of treatment chosen, the non-wage component of the
quality measures is important. This means quality is more a matter of having a well-
equipped facility with medicines in stock, than a matter of staff. This is in line with how
Tanzanians themselves evaluate their health system (Tanzania Social Sector Review,
1995). Infrastructure investments in dispensaries and health centres could make people
visit these facilities more, with a higher chance of benefits for the poor, since they visit
public dispensaries and health centres more frequently.
6. Conclusion and directions for further research
As the Tanzanians say: “Bora afya kuliko mali”, a good health is more valuable than
wealth. But being wealthy helps to be healthy. The importance of household income and
quality of medical care for health status as well as health demand in Tanzania is striking. In
a time when the theme of cost recovery is dominating in the health sector, this implies that
the implementation of cost sharing and user fees will be difficult in Tanzania, since it may
not be feasible for the poor and with the current level of quality of health care. Cost
recovery could have perverse effects, if not combined with a price differentiation according
to income and an improvement of quality of health facilities.
As transportation time and cost do not deter poor users, the rehabilitation of more
centralised health facilities that offer high quality care may be an alternative to the
expansion of the number of facilities. A finding confirmed in other poor African countries,
like Ethiopia, where Collier, Dercon and Mackinnon (1997) find that household usage of
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primary health facilities is far more sensitive to quality than to distance. For Tanzania,
direct effects of an increase in basic health service expenditures, and mainly in the nonwage
inputs, can be assumed to be favourable to health. Care has to be taken with
implementation, though. Nothing is said about the equity of the distribution of government
spending (Deolalikar, 1995). Moreover, the positive quality effect of more drugs, utensils
and so forth may be offset by the effects of consequent reductions in expenditures on the
wages of the employees, by increases in the prices of health service inputs (caused by an
increased demand acting on a fixed supply), or by cuts in the budgets of other social
services affecting health. As Lavy and Germain (1994) put it, results found indicate what
the effect of improving quality could be, not how it is financed.
Since distance does not seem be an issue for the poor, this indicates that the poor do not
ignore illness because they cannot afford to lose time, but because they lack the knowledge
needed for correct diagnosis. Usually, authors point to the role of education in
accumulating knowledge on health. But since the education effect is small for the
Tanzanian poor, the problem could be the result of a lack of information in general, like
access to the media. It could also be a consequence of a cultural determination of what
normal and good health is, which has been corrected by the rich using their education, but
not by the poor (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1988). Strauss and Thomas (1995) call this the
“information-processing effect”. The importance of knowledge and cultural habits is an
important finding for choosing policy instruments. The usual remedies proposed to
enhance health, e.g. investing in female education as the World Bank advocates, may not
necessarily be that effective to reach the Tanzanian poor. Education has only small effects
on health in Tanzania; enhancing female autonomy may be more important than educating
women. To make people more aware and better informed about health risks in the short
run, other channels than education, like public health campaigns, will have to be used.
Cost recovery is definitely a subject for further research, as is the refining of the
econometric model. Moreover, the data could be processed for the same issues for
comparison of different regions in Tanzania. Also, the survey data leave ample room for
further research on child mortality, another form of looking at health status, and preventive
health care, which has been neglected somewhat in Tanzania and probably could play a big
part in improving health statistics.
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Appendix I: Map of Tanzania
Figure 2: Map of Tanzania regions
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Appendix II: The Tanzanian health sector
Table 4: Demographic and health indicators of Tanzania
Census Census Census TDHS MOH MOH
Indicator 1967 1978 1988 1992 1994 1996
Total population (millions) 12.3 17.5 23.1 28.4
Male population (millions) 13.8
Female population (millions) 14.6
Population growth rate (%) 2.8
Density (pop./sq. km) 14.0 20.0 26.0
Percent urban 6.4 13.8 18.3
Crude birth rate 47.0 49.0 46.0
Crude death rate 24.4 19.0 15.0
Total fertility rate 6.6 6.9 6.7
Neonatal mortality rate 40.0
Post-neonatal mortality rate (per 1000) 60.0
Infant mortality rate (per 1000) 155.0 137.0 115.0 100.0 98.0
Under five mortality rate 191.0 155.0 161.0
Life expectancy at birth both sexes 41.0 44.0 50.0
Life expectancy at birth for male 49.0
Life expectancy at birth for female 51.0
Source: Health Statistics Abstract (1996) and Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey 1991/1992
Note: Figures are based on population census results of 1967, 1978 and 1988, on the Tanzania Demo-
graphic and Health Survey 1991/1992 for 1992, and on estimates of the Ministry of Health for 1994 and 1996.
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Appendix III: The recurrent government health expenditures for dispensaries and health centres in 1995/1996 on
he district level
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Appendix IV: Logistic regression model of incidence of treatment
with and without selecting the ill or injured
Behrman and Phananiramai or Pitt try to deal with the bias problems by structuring the
sample differently (Appleton, 1995). In the regression for the incidence of treatment, only
individuals who reported ill were included, being either “ill and treated” or “ill but not
treated”. The results of this regression are repeated in the first column of Table 6. An
alternative would be to run a regression where also healthy people are included, the
dependent variable then being either “ill and treated” or “healthy or ill but not treated”. The
results of this alternative regression are given in the second column of Table 6. The
disadvantage of the latter regression is that no distinction can be made between healthiness
or illness without treatment, the advantage is that the whole sample can be used.
Table 6: Logistic Regression Model of Incidence of Treatment
When ill, treated versus notTreated versus healthy or ill
treated (1=treated) but not treated (1=treated)
Number of cases 1940 13465
-2 Log Likelihood Reduced Model 2535.9522 8281.4635
-2 Log Likelihood Full Model 2485.8520 7840.7830
Chi-Square (16) 50.1010 440.6810
Significance Level 0.0000 0.0000
Variable Coefficient Wald Sig Coefficient Wald Sig
ln(age) -0.583 13.330 ** -1.471 252.414 **
ln (age squared) 0.120 12.110 ** 0.326 251.308 **
sex (female=1) -0.048 0.213 0.246 14.485 **
proportion women household-0.904 3.500 + -0.850 6.781 **
proportion boys household -0.556 2.067 -0.908 13.698 **
proportion girls household 0.970 5.717 * 0.095 0.129
ln (age household head) -0.217 1.436 -0.114 0.944
sex head (female=1) 0.348 4.299 * 0.441 19.274 **
education head (completed=1)-0.037 0.048 0.145 2.031
education head (completed=1)*poor-0.035 0.028 -0.215 2.808 +
 ln (consumption/month/capita) 0.179 8.589 ** 0.279 54.202 **
 ln (consumption/month/capita)*poor-0.021 0.509 -0.006 0.105
distance dispensary/health centre-0.024 5.326 * -0.014 3.589 +
distance dispensary/health centre*poor0.025 5.836 * 0.016 4.785 *
ln (total government disp/hc expenditures)-0.088 0.296 -0.380 13.079 **
% of non-wage in total 0.740 1.173 0.631 2.231
constant 2.279 0.766 3.522 4.157 *
Note: Sig = significance level of: ** = between 0 and 1 %, * = between 1 and 5 % and + = between 5 and 10 %.
Most results of the two regressions are similar. The most striking is the switch in signs of
the coefficients of the sex dummy and the education of the household head, while the
quality variable has become very significant. The gender effect here is positive and strongly
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significant. This means women seek more treatment, either because they are less healthy or
because they have more chances of treatment when ill, compared to men. The coefficient
of the education of the head of the family has turned positive, but is still insignificant. For
the poor though, the negative effect has been reinforced and has become significant. The
recurrent government expenditures, the proxy for quality of primary, public health care,
has a very significant, negative coefficient. The more the government spends on
dispensaries and health centres, the less people seek treatment. People with a higher quality
health facility in the neighbourhood are either healthier or more ill without seeking
treatment.
Overall, the alternative model performs well. The goodness of fit measure shows that the
full model is significantly different of the reduced model. Also, the predictive power is
higher than that of the first regression model, with 91 % of all observations predicted
correctly versus 64 % of the first regression.
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Table 5: Recurrent government health expenditures per district for health centres and dispensaries for 1995/96: total and per input (wage and nonwage) in Tanzanian Shillings
REGION REGION DISTRICT DISTRICT NAME TOTAL WAGE INPUT WAGE SHARE
NAME BUDGET  IN TOTAL  IN TOTAL
 BUDGET  BUDGET (%)
01 DODOMA 11 KONDOA RURAL 127,125,300 68,267,600 54
12 MPWAPWA RURAL 165,663,500 88,445,900 53
13 DODOMA RURAL 290,586,100 186,435,700 64
02 ARUSHA 21 MONDULI RURAL 85,506,500 43,966,500 51
22 ARUMERU RURAL 108,825,400 51,696,100 48
25 BABATI RURAL 91,416,400 55,924,800 61
26 HANANG RURAL 42,444,600 22,604,600 53
27 MBULU RURAL 81,210,100 60,635,100 75
03 KILIMANJARO 31 ROMBO RURAL 133,761,700 90,117,700 67
32 MWANGA RURAL 116,891,000 86,669,500 74
33 SAME RURAL 114,835,600 75,552,100 66
34 MOSHI RURAL 199,670,700 141,113,300 71
35 HAI RURAL 170,178,200 91,533,400 54
04 TANGA 41 LUSHOTO RURAL 115,282,500 76,534,100 66
43 MUHEZA RURAL 125,979,300 72,544,700 58
46 HANDENI RURAL 106,537,900 60,571,700 57
05 MOROGORO 51 KILOSA RURAL 149,495,300 78,505,300 53
52 MOROGORO RURAL 236,567,000 127,311,500 54
53 KILOMBERO RURAL 100,610,000 59,183,100 59
54 ULANGA RURAL 140,894,300 97,727,400 69
06 COAST 61 BAGAMOYO RURAL 123,250,300 70,433,200 57
62 KIBAHA RURAL 72,310,400 46,164,400 64
64 RUFIJI RURAL 116,626,700 67,187,400 58
65 MAFIA RURAL 48,274,500 34,384,600 71
08 LINDI 81 KILWA RURAL 101,181,400 63,433,100 63
82 LINDI RURAL 147,567,100 75,825,000 51
83 NACHINGWEA RURAL 67,778,700 42,183,000 62
09 MTWARA 91 MTWARA RURAL 107,760,900 63,652,000 59
92 NEWALA RURAL 130,790,900 95,129,500 73
93 MASASI RURAL 139,089,900 93,492,500 67
10 RUVUMA 102 SONGEA RURAL 178,533,500 116,194,100 65
103 MBINGA RURAL 145,571,900 78,193,500 54
11 IRINGA 111 IRINGA RURAL 159,747,500 69,796,100 44
112 MUFINDI RURAL 123,457,500 51,172,100 41
114 LUDEWA RURAL 104,788,100 50,256,400 48
115 MAKETE RURAL 78,630,300 36,947,500 47
Table 5 continued: Recurrent government health expenditures per district for health centres and dispensaries for 1995/96: total and per input (wage and nonwage) in Tanzanian Shillings
REGION REGION NAME DISTRICT DISTRICT NAME TOTAL WAGE INPUT WAGE SHARE
BUDGET  IN TOTAL  IN TOTAL
 BUDGET  BUDGET (%)
12 MBEYA 121 CHUNYA RURAL 90,295,600 61,372,600 68
122 MBEYA RURAL 139,729,900 79,750,000 57
123 KYELA RURAL 63,979,100 41,979,500 66
124 RUNGWE RURAL 121,533,000 73,076,900 60
126 MBOZI RURAL 101,876,600 57,040,300 56
13 SINGIDA 131 IRAMBA 138,033,800 62,595,100 45
132 SINGIDA RURAL 156,395,400 80,208,900 51
133 MANYONI RURAL 127,842,300 64,892,600 51
14 TABORA 142 IGUNGA RURAL 100,707,300 65,826,900 65
143 TABORA RURAL 141,061,400 69,246,800 49
144 URAMBO RURAL 115,673,300 73,122,800 63
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15 RUKWA 151 MPANDA RURAL 142,730,600 81,977,800 57
152 SUMBAWANGA RURAL 146,659,400 82,831,300 56
16 KIGOMA 161 KIBONDO RURAL 164,193,600 81,884,100 50
162 KASULU RURAL 146,725,400 69,950,700 48
17 SHINYANGA 171 BARIADI RURAL 108,341,400 58,842,000 54
172 MASWA RURAL 90,035,400 53,617,200 60
173 SHINYANGA RURAL 232,985,300 150,246,100 64
174 KAHAMA RURAL 129,919,900 70,832,900 55
176 MEATU RURAL 61,987,900 34,948,800 56
18 KAGERA 181 KARAGWE RURAL 129,316,500 84,998,700 66
182 BUKOBA RURAL 126,532,000 74,243,200 59
183 MULEBA RURAL 78,853,700 48,136,100 61
184 BIHARAMULO RURAL 94,085,000 62,519,500 66
185 NGARA RURAL 86,290,500 54,708,700 63
19 MWANZA 191 UKEREWE RURAL 129,852,400 82,724,800 64
192 MAGU RURAL 153,353,800 102,485,300 67
194 KWIMBA RURAL 218,850,700 135,573,300 62
195 SENGEREMA RURAL 182,722,300 124,045,800 68
196 GEITA RURAL 168,157,300 118,255,400 70
20 MARA 203 MUSOMA RURAL 141,664,700 86,897,600 61
204 BUNDA RURAL 119,598,800 74,608,900 62
Source: Mchanganuo wa fedha za Ruzuku kwa halmashauri za miji na wilaya kwa mwaka 1995/96, Kimepigwa Chapa na Mpigachapa wa Serikali, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
and Human Resource Development Survey 1993/1994, World Bank, Washington DC.
Notes: Only districts selected for the Human Resource Development Survey in rural areas are given here. 
Wage input consists of personal emoluments. Nonwage input consists of driving vehicles, utensils, food and medicines etc.
1 US $ was about 600 Tanzanian Shillings during this period.
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Table 5: Recurrent government health expenditures per district for health centres and dispensaries for 1995/96: total and per input (wage and nonwage) in Tanzanian Shillings
NONWAGE INPUT NONWAGE SHARE N° OF HEALTH BUDGET PER WAGE INPUT PER NONWAGE INPUT PER
 IN TOTAL  IN TOTAL  CENTRES AND HEALTH CENTRE HEALTH CENTRE HEALTH CENTRE
 BUDGET  BUDGET (%)  DISPENSARIES OR DISPENSARY OR DISPENSARY OR DISPENSARY
58,857,700 46 47 2,704,794 1,452,502 1,252,291
77,217,600 47 45 3,681,411 1,965,464 1,715,947
104,150,400 36 65 4,470,555 2,868,242 1,602,314
41,540,000 49 26 3,288,712 1,691,019 1,597,692
57,129,300 52 36 3,022,928 1,436,003 1,586,925
35,491,600 39 23 3,974,626 2,431,513 1,543,113
19,840,000 47 16 2,652,788 1,412,788 1,240,000
20,575,000 25 29 2,800,348 2,090,866 709,483
43,644,000 33 13 10,289,362 6,932,131 3,357,231
30,221,500 26 31 3,770,677 2,795,790 974,887
39,283,500 34 38 3,021,989 1,988,213 1,033,776
58,557,400 29 28 7,131,096 5,039,761 2,091,336
78,644,800 46 35 4,862,234 2,615,240 2,246,994
38,748,400 34 36 3,202,292 2,125,947 1,076,344
53,434,600 42 53 2,376,968 1,368,768 1,008,200
45,966,200 43 34 3,133,468 1,781,521 1,351,947
70,990,000 47 59 2,533,819 1,330,598 1,203,220
109,255,500 46 78 3,032,910 1,632,199 1,400,712
41,426,900 41 26 3,869,615 2,276,273 1,593,342
43,166,900 31 28 5,031,939 3,490,264 1,541,675
52,817,100 43 38 3,243,429 1,853,505 1,389,924
26,146,000 36 13 5,562,338 3,551,108 2,011,231
49,439,300 42 41 2,844,554 1,638,717 1,205,837
13,889,900 29 09 5,363,833 3,820,511 1,543,322
37,748,300 37 28 3,613,621 2,265,468 1,348,154
71,742,100 49 26 5,675,658 2,916,346 2,759,312
25,595,700 38 18 3,765,483 2,343,500 1,421,983
44,108,900 41 32 3,367,528 1,989,125 1,378,403
35,661,400 27 46 2,843,280 2,068,033 775,248
45,597,400 33 43 3,234,649 2,174,244 1,060,405
62,339,400 35 51 3,500,657 2,278,316 1,222,341
67,378,400 46 48 3,032,748 1,629,031 1,403,717
89,951,400 56 41 3,896,280 1,702,344 2,193,937
72,285,400 59 40 3,086,438 1,279,303 1,807,135
54,531,700 52 17 6,164,006 2,956,259 3,207,747
41,682,800 53 27 2,912,233 1,368,426 1,543,807
Table 5 continued: Recurrent government health expenditures per district for health centres and dispensaries for 1995/96: total and per input (wage and nonwage) in Tanzanian Shillings
NONWAGE INPUT NONWAGE SHARE N° OF HEALTH BUDGET PER WAGE INPUT PER NONWAGE INPUT PER
 IN TOTAL  IN TOTAL  CENTRES AND HEALTH CENTRE HEALTH CENTRE HEALTH CENTRE
 BUDGET  BUDGET (%)  DISPENSARIES OR DISPENSARY OR DISPENSARY OR DISPENSARY
28,923,000 32 27 3,344,281 2,273,059 1,071,222
59,979,900 43 52 2,687,113 1,533,654 1,153,460
21,999,600 34 20 3,198,955 2,098,975 1,099,980
48,456,100 40 38 3,198,237 1,923,076 1,275,161
44,836,300 44 33 3,087,170 1,728,494 1,358,676
75,438,700 55 60 2,300,563 1,043,252 1,257,312
76,186,500 49 40 3,909,885 2,005,223 1,904,663
62,949,700 49 36 3,551,175 1,802,572 1,748,603
34,880,400 35 13 7,746,715 5,063,608 2,683,108
71,814,600 51 16 8,816,338 4,327,925 4,488,413
42,550,500 37 25 4,626,932 2,924,912 1,702,020
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60,752,800 43 20 7,136,530 4,098,890 3,037,640
63,828,100 44 04 36,664,850 20,707,825 15,957,025
82,309,500 50 33 4,975,564 2,481,336 2,494,227
76,774,700 52 28 5,240,193 2,498,239 2,741,954
49,499,400 46 40 2,708,535 1,471,050 1,237,485
36,418,200 40 28 3,215,550 1,914,900 1,300,650
82,739,200 36 60 3,883,088 2,504,102 1,378,987
59,087,000 45 28 4,639,996 2,529,746 2,110,250
27,039,100 44 23 2,695,126 1,519,513 1,175,613
44,317,800 34 30 4,310,550 2,833,290 1,477,260
52,288,800 41 59 2,144,610 1,258,359 886,251
30,717,600 39 22 3,584,259 2,188,005 1,396,255
31,565,500 34 26 3,618,654 2,404,596 1,214,058
31,581,800 37 18 4,793,917 3,039,372 1,754,544
47,127,600 36 28 4,637,586 2,954,457 1,683,129
50,868,500 33 44 3,485,314 2,329,211 1,156,102
83,277,400 38 59 3,709,334 2,297,853 1,411,481
58,676,500 32 35 5,220,637 3,544,166 1,676,471
49,901,900 30 48 3,503,277 2,463,654 1,039,623
54,767,100 39 37 3,828,776 2,348,584 1,480,192
44,989,900 38 23 5,199,948 3,243,865 1,956,083
Mchanganuo wa fedha za Ruzuku kwa halmashauri za miji na wilaya kwa mwaka 1995/96, Kimepigwa Chapa na Mpigachapa wa Serikali, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Wage input consists of personal emoluments. Nonwage input consists of driving vehicles, utensils, food and medicines etc.
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